7 U.S. Const. amend. XX, ?? 1-2. 8 Ackerman makes a strong case that supporters of the Twentieth Amendment believed that it would eliminate lame-duck sessions of Congress, barring extraordinary circumstances. See Ackerman, Case Against Lameduck Impeachment, supra note 6, at 24-31. He also makes the important point that they explicitly intended to end the lame-duck House's role in selecting Presidents when the electoral college failed to produce a majority victor. See id. at 33-38. But even Ackerman concedes that it is one thing for supporters of the Amendment not to contemplate future lame-duck sessions and another for the Amendment actually to forbid them. See id. at 30-31. Thus, Ackerman in the end concedes that lame-duck impeachments are not unconstitutional, just a bad idea. See id. at 39-40. His constitutional claim, on the other hand, is limited to lame-duck impeachments that are not acted on by the Senate during the same Congress. See id. at 40-41. 9 See id. at 9-10,31-32. 10 See id. Ackerman endeavors to extricate himself from a difficult position with characteristic ingenuity. The logic of his Twentieth Amendment argument condemns all lame-duck sessions of Congress, not just lame-duck impeachments. Obviously Ackerman does not wish to challenge this widely accepted a practice. Similarly, Ackerman's argument against separate Congresses impeaching and convicting the President would seem applicable even to non-lame-duck impeachments. But this interpretation would require Ackerman to reject the constitutionality of three prior Senate impeachment trials, which is more of a load than he wishes to carry. Acker-tially considered endorsing this constitutional argument.1 The difficulty with it is that impeachment by the House can be seen as an act complete in itself in a way that one house's passage of legislation cannot be. Under British practice, which was followed by Thomas Jefferson in his influential Manual of Parliamentary Practice, 2 impeachments carried over from one Parliament to the next, unlike ordinary legislative bills.'3 Indeed, three of the Senate's previous fourteen impeachment trials involved "carryover" impeachments.14 The "same Congress" argument thus is no more persuasive than the lame-duck contention; neither has any support in the constitutional text. man thus combines the lame-duck point with the "same Congress" argument, yielding a constitutional rule that has the virtue of cohering with existing practice: After the Twentieth Amendment, lame-duck impeachments lose their force with the end of a Congress. Yet by struggling so mightily to cohere his rule with existing practice, Ackerman unintentionally weakens its constitutional foundations. It seems more plausible to argue, for example, that the Twentieth Amendment forbids all lameduck sessions of Congress, as many of its supporters seemed to contemplate, than that it forbids only lame-duck impeachments, which is a subject to which not one of them apparently gave any thought. See id. at 39-40. Ackerman's rule also has the anomalous effect of legitimizing a lame-duck Senate conviction-a result that should give Ackerman pause in light of his aversion to lame-duck exercises of power. On the other side of the aisle, the Republicans' principal constitutional arguments were every bit as unpersuasive. Some impeachment proponents claimed that the Constitution denied Congress the discretion not to impeach the President if he was found to have committed high crimes and misdemeanors.5 This is hard to fathom. The relevant constitutional text provides that "The President... shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,... high Crimes and Misdemeanors."'6 This language seems to suggest that a conviction requires removal from office; it does not indicate that the House lacks discretion not to impeach if a high crime or misdemeanor has been committed. Nor is it obvious why, as a policy matter, one would wish to deprive the House of discretion in this regard. Prosecutors ordinarily are vested with enormous discretion over which crimes to prosecute.
Equally strained was the argument advanced by numerous Republican Senators that once the House impeached the President, the Senate had no choice but to conduct a trial on that impeachment. Let us now set aside this deadhand objection to originalism. Assume that originalist evidence is and should be relevant to constitutional interpretation. An additional set of originalist difficulties still remains: ascertaining original intent on issues that were not confronted by the Framers, figuring out the collective intent when individual Framers disagreed, and selecting the appropriate level of generality at which to ask the originalist query. I shall consider these difficulties in turn.
On many of the constitutional issues surrounding the Clinton impeachment, there simply is no original intent because the Framers did not consider the matter. There was no discussion in Philadelphia of, and apparently no consideration given to, subjects such as what the Senate trial of an impeachment should look like or whether alternative sanctions such as censure or findings of fact are permissible. Asking what the Framers would have thought about these issues had they considered them-if that is the correct originalist inquiry, which is debatable-seems obviously indeterminate. How could one possibly know?
The Framers did discuss and voice opinions on the important issue of impeachment standards-the meaning of high crimes and misdemeanors.43 But here we run into the difficulty of ascertaining collective intent when individuals disagreed. First, it is important to recognize that relatively little attention was paid in Philadelphia to this question of impeachment standards; there was far more discussion, for example, of whether the Senate was the appropriate body to try impeachments." Only a relative handful of convention delegates spoke on this (or, for that matter, any other) question. ures , there is no reason to believe that their interpretations of "high crimes and misdemeanors" were representative, and they certainly were entitled to no more weight than anyone else's. Similarly, Alexander Hamilton's pronouncement on impeachment standards in the Federalist Papers has received great attention, but it is questionable how much weight it should bear (even setting aside the problem that Hamilton's statement is too vague to settle the Clinton controversy). Hamilton was just one of the Framers, and he was not even present in Philadelphia when the principal debate on impeachment standards took place. Moreover, given Hamilton's unorthodox perspective on executive power, it is doubtful how much weight his views regarding presidential removal should receive. Hamilton thought the President should serve for life,46 and thus it hardly would be surprising if his preferred standard for removal differed from that of the less monarchist delegates in Philadelphia. In sum, examining the fairly sparse originalist record can, at most, provide a sense of the range of views held regarding the impeachment standard; it cannot tell us where the consensus lay, if indeed it is meaningful to speak of a consensus on an issue that was of relatively minor concern to the drafters and ratifiers and thus garnered relatively little of their attention.
Yet the originalist dilemma grows even more severe. 53 The levels of generality problem is precisely the same as the translation problem, though considered from the opposite angle. Specifying a particular level of generality determines which changed circumstances are relevant to the translation (to be treated as variables) and which are not (to be treated as constants). Posed either way, the question has no "natural" answer. See Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 29, at 408. peached. Arguably, a higher standard should apply to presidential impeachments, both because the consequences of removal seem greater for the nation and because electoral accountability provides an alternative mechanism for removal.58 Conversely, one might argue that because the President's job is so much more important, transgressions that might be overlooked in a federal court judge must be noticed and addressed when committed by the nation's chief executive.59 Moreover, it is not obvious that precedent should have the same binding effect on the United States Senate sitting as a court of impeachment as it supposedly does on ordinary courts. Nobody thinks that Members of Congress are bound by "precedent" when engaged in their lawmaking functions; one of Congress's jobs is to change the law. If impeachment is a mixed operation of law and politics, the appropriate role of "precedent" is uncertain.
Finally, even courts are free to overturn their own precedents, and the United States Supreme Court frequently does so, especially in constitutional cases.6 A court that is free on any given occasion to overrule its own precedents, and has no law-like formula defining when it is appropriate to do so,61 is not in any sense bound by precedent. Rather, it makes political choices to adhere to precedent on certain occasions and to repudiate it on others. The Senate likewise has been, at most, selectively committed to precedent in its conduct of impeachment trials. For example, for the first 150 years of American constitutional history, the Senate conducted impeachment trials before the entire body. [Vol. 85:631federal judges, the Senate changed its rules to permit a bifurcated trial process, under which initial fact-finding was conducted by a committee of Senators who then made a report to the entire body, which heard abbreviated arguments and then voted. In three impeachment trials of federal judges in the 1980s, the Senate implemented this bifurcated trial procedure.62 If past Senate precedent were relevant to constitutional interpretations regarding impeachment, this truncated trial format should have been of dubious constitutionality. Yet the Senate concluded otherwise, and the Supreme Court ruled the matter a nonjusticiable political question,63 which may be the same thing as holding it constitutional. Apparently, then, Senate precedent is, at most, selectively relevant to constitutional interpretations regarding impeachment. This, however, is just another way of saying that precedent serves as a form of justificatory rhetoric, rather than as an actual guide to constitutional interpretation.
Nevertheless, both sides in the Clinton impeachment debate presented arguments from precedent. Republican politicians and commentators invoked precedent in support of their claim that the Constitution prohibited truncating the Senate trial; all of the Senate's fourteen previous impeachment trials had been carried through to their conclusion.64 But how persuasive is that evidence? In all of those previous trials, it seemed likely-or at least plausible-that the votes necessary for removal from office were attainable. Those precedents hardly demonstrate that the Senate lacks discretion to abbreviate an impeachment trial after the vote on a motion to dismiss has conclusively revealed the absence of the requisite supermajority for conviction. Secretary of the Treasury to remove federal government deposits from the national bank.6 But Jackson's defenders argued at the time that censure was unconstitutional because it was not explicitly contemplated by the Constitution, and the censure resolution was rescinded three years later, once Jackson's supporters regained control of the Senate.67 What is one to make of this precedent? The fact that the Senate once censured a sitting President over strong constitutional protests, and soon changed its mind and rescinded the censure resolution, hardly proves that this constitutional power exists. [Vol. 85:631 ality of censure.74 Late in the Senate trial, when it became obvious that conviction was unattainable, most Republicans (including those who earlier had condemned censure as unconstitutional) endorsed findings of fact,75 while virtually all Democrats condemned them as unconstitutional.76 Once it became apparent that findings of fact could secure no significant Democratic support, and thus would lend credibility to Democratic charges of a partisan vendetta against the President, Republicans lost their enthusiasm for this alternative, often justifying their change of heart in terms of constitutional doubts regarding findings of fact.77 After the articles of impeachment failed, Republicans blocked a censure resolution because they did not wish to provide political cover for Democrats who had opposed removal, though they justified their opposition to censure in terms of its unconstitutionality.78 Because the Constitution simply does not resolve the issues of censure and findings of fact, it is hard to believe that minds were changed by any of these constitutional arguments.
1999] Constitutional Fetishism and Impeachment
The combination of sparse text, ambiguous original intent, and scarce precedent of dubious relevance means that Congress was confronted with little "law" governing the Clinton impeachment.9 When law is this indeterminate, one inevitably finds some other factor-namely politics, broadly defined-determining outcomes.8 Nevertheless, the impeachment debate was conducted largely in constitutional terms, and one is entitled to wonder about the consequences of constitutionalizing what was, in reality, a thoroughly political debate. One possibility is that there were no significant consequences. If the various constitutional arguments surrounding impeachment were as completely unpersuasive as I have suggested, one wonders if they had any effect whatsoever. For example, no Republicans evidently were convinced by the argument that a lame-duck session of the House could not impeach the President, and no Democrats by the contention that the Senate was constitutionally obliged to hold a trial once the House impeached.
While virtually all the constitutional arguments surrounding impeachment were unpersuasive, they still may have had two deleterious consequences. First, debating impeachment questions in constitutional terms enabled politicians to evade responsibility for their actions. This happened on both sides of the aisle. Democrats should have concentrated on the argument that the President's transgressions were not sufficiently serious to render the country better off by abbreviating his term of office. Instead, they mainly argued that the Constitution did not permit his removal because his misdeeds failed to satisfy the Framers' conception of "high crimes and misdemeanors."8' That argument was a distraction. Whether 79 But cf. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, supra note 33, at 315 (arguing that "[t]ext, history, and long-standing practice" converge on a very high standard for presidential impeachment). One potential difficulty with Professor Sunstein's conclusion regarding the clarity of the "law" governing the impeachment standard is that it seems to imply that the vast majority of Republicans who favored Clinton's impeachment were either ignorant or hypocritical. 80 Advocates of President Clinton's impeachment and removal traded on this antimajoritarian aspect of constitutionalism. Claiming the moral high ground, they invoked the "minority rights" conception of constitutionalism to justify ignoring opinion polls and congressional election results that revealed a substantial majority of Americans opposing the President's removal from office.83 Yet sometimes the Constitution does require that we follow election returns. Popular majorities do get to elect Representatives and Senators, and with the slight complication of the electoral college, Presidents as well. If after the 1992 presidential election, Republicans had tried to block Clinton's assumption of office, arguing that they were following the moral high ground by ignoring the election returns, their actions rightly would have been perceived as revolutionary rather than praiseworthy. This is because one's entitlement to hold office in a democratic system is based, generally speaking, on majority support.
The pressing question in the Clinton controversy was whether impeachment is more like issues where we protect minority rights from majoritarian oppression or issues where we award popular majorities the fruits of their electoral triumphs. By invoking constitutional rhetoric, Republicans implicitly tapped into the antimajoritarian strand of constitutional law-the safeguarding of minority rights from majoritarian oppression. It is difficult, however, to fathom why impeachment is an issue upon which minorities warrant protection from majoritarian decisionmaking. If popular majorities get to elect a President, it is hard to see why they should be ignored on the question of whether he remains fit to hold office. 5 I do not mean to suggest that in all impeachment cases, the only legitimate method for Members of Congress to decide how to vote is to poll their constituents. Given the vagaries of opinion polling, in a close case this probably would not be a sensible way to proceed. But President Clinton's was not a close case, at least not according to public sentiment. Even Republican opponents of the President did not contend that the public favored impeachment; they argued instead that public opinion was irrelevant. When roughly two-thirds of the electorate favors retaining the President in office, it is hard to fathom the argument for why he should be removed, no matter how strongly the opposition party feels he has transgressed.
Nor does my argument necessarily entail lowering the threshold for impeachment when the President's approval ratings have bottomed out. Ours is not a parliamentary system featuring votes of no confidence to remove Executives before expiration of their elected terms; the virtues and vices of such a system are beyond the scope of this Essay. Our constitutional system requires that the President do something seriously wrong, rather than just a bad job, before impeachment and removal is authorized. This said, I see no reason why in close cases public opinion should not be relevant to determining whether an unpopular President's transgressions arise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors. Most of the Constitution, of course, is not nearly so determinate, as the recent impeachment controversy has reminded us. The impeachment standard of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is sufficiently indeterminate, and President Clinton's conduct was sufficiently serious, but not obviously so serious, that Republicans and Democrats divided almost precisely along partisan lines in their conclusions as to whether that standard had been satisfied. Similarly, with regard to other impeachment-related issues-such as the constitutionality of findings of fact or the Senate's discretion to truncate the trial-constitutional interpretations followed partisan lines with stunning regularity. In the face of legal indeterminacy, it seems natural that political factors will determine constitutional interpretations. Thus, for example, in 1860 both southerners and northerners were equally convinced that the Constitution supported their conflicting views on secession,4 just as one hundred years later they were equally confident that it supported their diametrically opposing views on the permissibility of school segregation.95 It is no great surprise that when the Justices of the Supreme Court today take up issues of abortion, affirmative action, minority voting districts, school prayer, and federalism, they tend to divide along predictable political lines.96 The Constitution is relatively indeterminate on these issues; thus it seems inevitable that political differences will reappear in the guise of constitutional interpretations.
Many people find this phenomenon disconcerting, perhaps because most issues of constitutional interpretation involve judges deciding whether to invalidate legislative or executive action. To the extent constitutional interpretation involves judges supplanting the political judgments of elected officials with their own, serious questions of democratic legitimacy arise.97 Federal judges are unelected and, at most, indirectly accountable; moreover, they tend to reflect the values of the socioeconomic elite from whose ranks they are drawn.98 This countermajoritarian difficulty is not present, however, when elected politicians are performing the constitutional interpretation. Then, the use of constitutional rhetoric simply masks political preferences rather than substituting the preferences of one set of actors for those of another. Since the constitutional rhetoric is transparent to most participants, it is not obvious that constitutionalizing a political debate like impeachment alters it in any significant way. Only when Republican Members of Congress came to believe their own constitutional rhetoric and concluded that their constituents' preferences were irrelevant to the question of whether the President should have been removed from office did constitutionalizing the impeachment debate become pernicious.
Making the constitutional standard for impeachment more definite probably would render the outcome of any future impeach-[Vol. 85:631 ment proceedings less partisan. If the Constitution provided that Presidents shall be impeached and removed from office for committing particular specified offenses (in addition to treason and bribery, which already are enumerated), the clarity of the rule probably would constrain partisan disagreements. Yet it seems doubtful whether such a gain in clarity would be worth the costs.9 Some Presidents (and judges) who committed the specified offenses might be better left in office, and others who committed nonspecified offenses possibly should be removed. Standards generally are preferable to rules for achieving outcomes sensitive to diverse factual contexts."? But standards inevitably require the exercise of discretion, and discretion invites the interpreter to apply his or her own values.01' The critical question in the impeachment context is whether or not such discretion is a good thing. A vague (and thus discretionary) impeachment standard probably boils down to this: Setting aside cases where the President's conduct is either so egregious or so trivial that both sides will agree on the propriety of removal, intermediate cases likely will result in partisan splits.'02 Thus, Presidents will be removable from office either when the objectionable conduct meets a threshold standard and the impeaching party has a two-thirds majority in the Senate, or when the conduct is sufficiently egregious that bipartisan support for impeachment exists. The former scenario is extraordinarily rare; the President's party almost never holds fewer than one-third of the Senate's seats. Andrew Johnson was the only President in American history to fit that scenario;'03 he had been nominated for the vice-presidency by a party to which he did not then belong and whose principles he had thoroughly repudiated by the time of his impeachment.14 Richard Nixon fit the latter scenario.'05 President Clinton fit neither and thus predictably was acquitted. It is hard to quarrel with that result when a clear majority of Americans endorsed it. Only an unreflective invocation of constitutional rhetoric disabled some participants in the impeachment debate from appreciating this.
